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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BYRON C. MUNSEE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 9351 
EDNA MUNSEE, 
Defend;ant and Res,pondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Case appearing in the 
brief of Appellant, is not supported by the Record. 
A part of the difficulty derives from the fact that 
no apparent effort has been made to reference the 
purportedly factual statements therein made to the 
Transcript of Record. Some of the allegations, while 
unsupported by the Record, are probably immaterial 
to the determination of the issues in this case. In 
order that this Court may consider only the evidence 
as it was presented to the lower Court, Respondent 
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makes the following statement of facts based on 
the record in the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent and the Appellant were married 
in Phoenix, Arizona on the lOth day of March 1958. 
(R. 1 & 5) Appellant and Respondent came to Salt 
Lake City, Utah and resided with Appellant's mother 
just prior to Appellant's entering the Armed Forces 
of the United States. (R. Tr. No. 1 P. 5) Appellant 
joined the Air Force in October of 1958. (R. 5) 
Appellant has not resided in Utah since entry in the 
armed services of the United States in October 1958. 
(R. 5) Neither Appellant or Respondent has within 
three months prior to the commencement of the ac-
tion maintained a residence in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, either rented, owned, or borrowed. 
(R. Tr. No. 2, p. 2) Neither Appellant nor Respon-
dent lrad a residence within Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah to which they could return or to which they 
expressed an intention of returning or· at which 
their mail was accumulated. (R. Tr. No. 1, p.5) 
The entire record is absolutely devoid of any indica-
tion that Utah was, three months prior to commence-
ment of ~the action, actually the residence or legal 
domicile of the parties. There is not ~any statement 
in the record from which it might be argued that 
either ·Of the parties after leaving Utah in October 
1958 intended to return to Utah as a permanent 
residence. 
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POINT RELIED UPON 
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT HEREIN - TO VEST 
THE UTAH COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO DECREE 
DISSOLUTION OF HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT 
IS REQUIRED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE TO THE 
COURT THAT HE HAS BEEN AN ACTUAL AND BONA 
FIDE RESIDENT OF THIS STATE AND OF THE 
COUNTY WHERE THE ACTION IS BROUGHT FOR 
THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT 
OF THE ACTION. SINCE APPELLANT FAILED TO 
DO SO THE LOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DIS-
MISS THE ACTION FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT HEREIN - TO VEST 
THE UTAH COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO DECREE 
DISSOLUTION OF HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT 
IS REQUIRED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE TO THE 
COURT THAT HE HAS BEEN AN ACTUAL AND BONA 
FIDE RESIDENT OF THIS STATE AND OF THE 
COUNTY WHERE THE ACTION IS BROUGHT FOR 
THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT 
OF THE ACTION. SINCE APPELLANT FAILED TO 
DO SO THE LOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED TO VIS-
MISS THE ACTION FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. 
30-3-1 UCA 195'3 as amended provides: 
"30-3-1. Procedure - Residence -
Grounds. - Proceedings in divor'ce shall be 
commenced and conducted in the manner pro-
vided by law for proceedings in civil causes, 
except 1as hereinafter provided, and the court 
may 'decree a dissolution of the marriage con-
tract between the plaintiff and defendant in 
all cases where the plaintiff shall have been 
an actual and bona fide resident of thi's state 
and of the county where the action is brought 
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for three months next prior to the comme~ce­
ment of the action, for any of the following 
causes: * * *" 
This section of the Utah Code has been pre-
viously interpreted by this Honorable Court. In the 
case of Weiss v. Weiss, decided May ·2, 194 7, 111 
U. 3'53, 179 P. 2d 1005, this court in reference to the 
section quoted stated: 
"This is a limitation on the power of the 
court to 'act in respect to the marriage 'status 
ensuing therefrom. If the court finds that 
there was an actual and bona fide residence as 
specified it has the power to dissolve or re-
fuse to dissolve the contract depending on 
what it concludes as to the merits of the case. 
If it finds that there was not such residence 
it has no power to further act as to the m~ar­
ri'age contract and if it acts in such regard it 
exceeds its authority. * * * The court after 
the filing of the complaint had power and 
authority, in fact the duty, to determine 
whether or not it had jurisdiction of the status 
of marri'age existing between the defendant 
and plain tiff. * * * The court had power to 
'determine that jurisdictional fact, but having 
determined that the length and type of resi-
dence required for it to obtain jurisdiction 
of the status of the marriage between the 
plain tiff and defendant did not exist it should 
have dismissed the 'action for lack of juris-
diction respecting the marriage contract and 
the status of marriage ensuing therefrom. 
* * *" 
In the instant case appellant alleged in his com-
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plaint that he was an actual and borra fide resident 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and had been 
so for more than three months immediately prior to 
the commencement of the a'ction. ( R. 1) This state-
ment was denied by respondent in her 'answer (R. 5), 
and was further traversed by her in her Motion for 
Order Va'catirrg Order of Custody and To kbate 
action and Suspend Proceedings. ( R. 7) Under this 
state of the pleading the appellant had the burden 
of proving residence to meet the statutory require-
ments. 
17 Am. Jur. DIVORCE & SEPARA-
TION -· P. 5128, Sec. 390 - ''Residence or 
Domicil. - Prior to the en try of the final 
decree of divorce, the court is not to presume 
or assume th'at the plaintiff has 1a domicil 
within the state or that he has complied with 
the statute prescribing a period of residence 
before suing for a divorce. The plaintiff has 
the burden of proving that he hais a domicil 
within the state and that he ha:s complied with 
the statute prescribing the preliminary period 
of residence. * * * '' 
"When the defendant moves to dismiss 
the suit on the groun'd that the plain tiff is not 
a resident of 'the divorce state, the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving that he is a resi-
dent. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 1'53 Fla. 8'561 16 So. 
2d '47. 
In the ca'Se of Gladney v. Gladney, 'a Texa:s case 
24 SW '2d 9'6, the plain tiff claimed the residence of 
his parents 'as his residence for the purpose of at-
tempting to satisfy the statutory residential re-
quirement. The Court held: 
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"The Burden of proving residence . to 
qualify is on plaintiff and m~rely to claim 
his fathers residence a:s his Without further 
proof is not sufficient to constitute compliance 
with ~a statute requiring resi'dence for six 
months next prior to the commencement of 
the action." 
That the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that 
plaintiff h'as the burden of proving compliance with 
the statu tory residence requirements seem's to be 
clearly shown by the language employed in the case 
of Kidman v. Kidman, decided Dec. 11, 194'5, 109 
U. 81, 164 P. 2d 201. At page 202 of the Pacific 
Report of the opinion the court said: 
"Respondent alleged that he was an ac-
tual bona fide resident of Sanpete County. 
This allegation was expressly admitted by 
answer. However, plaintiff's testimony as to 
his bona fide residence was somewhat meager. 
This sketchy testimony on the matter was ap-
parently due to the fact th'at, in view of the 
admission contained in the answer, counsel 
assumed that there was no actual issue rela-
tive thereto. Had there been a controversy as 
to residence, a serious question might arise 
as to whether the allegations of bona fide resi-
dence in Sanpete County were sufficiently 
proved. * * *" 
There seems to be no question, therefore, that 
the burden of proving the allegations of the com-
plaint of Appellant of residence in Salt Lake County, 
to give the court jurisdiction under the law fell 
' upon the plaintiff and appellant herein. This burden 
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Appellant failed to carry. 'The Court below afforded 
to Appellant's attorney ~and to appellant, who was 
present in court, ample opportunity to give any facts 
which would support the allegations. (R. Tr. No. 1, 
p. 15) The record is totally devoi1d of any proof of 
residence meeting the statutory requirements. 
Appellant in his brief has chosen to treat this 
matter as one in which the requirement of actual 
bona fide residence in the state and county for three 
months next prior to the commencement of the ac-
tion, would be in some manner waived or eliminated 
because the appellant was in the United States Air 
Force. Appellant has also dealt at length with the 
definition of domicile. The previously rendered de-
cisions of this Court have established that the re-
quirements for dom'i!cile generally, and the statu-
tory resi1dence requirments of the divorce statute are 
not the same. 
In the ,case of Kidman v. Kidman, (supra) at 
page 202 of the Pacific Report the court says : 
"The first recited assignment is ground-
ed upon the provisions of Sec. 40-3-1 DCA 
1943 (note: this is the same section as 30-3-1 
DCA 1953) as amended by Chap. 46, Laws of 
1943, whereby jurisdiction is conferred upon 
'a district court to decree dissolution of the 
marriage contract ''where the plaintiff shall 
have been an actual and bona fide resident 
of this state and of the county where the a'c-
tion is brought for three months next prior 
to the commencement of the action." We as-
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sume that being an "'actual and bona f~de 
resi'dent" of a county comprehends the main-
tenance therein of something more than a 
mere legal residence." 
In the case of Weiss v. Weiss (supra) the Court 
was more specific: 
at Page 1008 of the Pacific Report: - "In 
this state, and in fact in many states the old 
basis of matrimonial domicile as the condi-
tion for jurisdiction of the "matrimonial res" 
or marital status has given way to "unitary 
domicile" as the basis of jurisdiction. And 
unitary domicile need be according to the in-
terpretations of certain of the state courts 
construing the term "residence" as used in 
the statutes, little if any more than mere 
presence in the state for the preS'cribed length 
of time, and under the second Williams case, 
supra, states other than that of the ori-
ginal forum are free to attack collateraiiy 
the jurisdictional grounds of the de'Cree grant-
ed by the divorcing state. The confusion and 
uncertainty of divorce de'crees in any other 
than the state granting them by the present 
state of the law is well pointed out in the dis-
senting opinions in the second Williams case, 
supra. It should be pointed out that the matter 
of legal confusion and uncertainty is not iden-
tical with the deeper underlying social prob-
lems that are involved in easy and strict di-
vorce laws upon which the stability or deteri-
oration of our social structure may depend 
although they are connected problems. And 
it is not here our provin'Ce to suggest social 
remedies. * * *" 
Speaking on this same subject and particularly 
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as affected by military services the law is stated 
by American Juris prudence to be: 
17 Am. Jur. DIVORCE AND SE'PARA-
ATI'ON P. 4'70, Sec. 297 "Generally. -'The 
general rule that the domicil of a member of 
the Armed Forces is not changed or lost ·by 
his en try in to military servi~e or by his be-
ing sent to another jurisdiction under mili-
tary orders is rapplied in divorce cases, so that 
in determining the jurisdiction domicil of a 
member of the Armed Forces, the fact that he 
is transferred to a post outside the state does 
not affect the domicil that he had prior to the 
transfer. In many states, however, the juris-
dictional requisite is "actual residence" as 
distinguished from, and in addition to, legal 
domicil, and where a member of the Armed 
Forces had a legal domicil within the state 
but had been absent from the state on mili-
tary service for 'all, or nearly all, of the sta-
tutory waiting period and did not maintain a 
residence within the state while he was absent, 
it has been held that he did not have an ac-
tual residence within the state ras required 
by the divorce statute." 
In the case of Marshall v. Marshall, a Connecti-
cut case, 36 A 2d 7 43 the Court was 'called upon 
to interpret the Connecticut Statute which provides, 
"If Plaintiff shall not have continuously resided in 
this state three years next before the date of the 
·complaint, it shall be dismissed." In the Marshall 
case the facts were that Plain tiff was in the United 
State Navy and assigned to New London, Connecti-
cut. He expressed himself as having become very 
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~ttached to New London and its people and intend-
ing to return there to live when he retired. Pr'ior to 
his retirement he was transferred in 1938 to Boston, 
M~assa:chussetts and he remained there for several 
years prior to the commencement of the divorce ac-
tion. The fa:cts reflected that he had not returned 
to New London during his tour of duty in Boston. 
The Court held that while plaintiff's intention to 
return to New London might be sufficient to keep 
his domicile in New London, it did not support a 
finding of continuous residence as required by law. 
The Court took cognizance of the admonition direct .. 
ed to it that under such a ruling very few service 
men could meet the necessary residential require-
ments for a divorce in Connecticut, but the Court 
said that if this was so it constituted a legislative, 
not a judicial problem. 
In the Idaho case of Hampshire v. Hampshire, 
decided Nov. 10, 1'950, ;70 Idaho 52'2, 223 P. 2d 950 
the court held that the Idaho statute requiring ac-
tual bona fide residence for six full weeks prior to 
Commencement of the action, Section 32-701 Idaho 
Code meant: 
"To constitute a residence within the 
meaning of the divorce statute, there must be 
a habitation or abode in a particular place for 
the required time and an intention to remain 
there permaneJ?-tly or. indefinitely. An actual 
residence as distinguished from a construc-
tive one." 
10 
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Perhaps the landmark case in this field is the 
case of Hiles v. Hiles, a Virginia case decided March 
14, 1935, 178 SE 913. In this 'case the plaintiff was 
a pay clerk in the United States Navy. In 1919 he 
married the defendant a:t Dover, New Hampshire. 
He was transferred thereafter to Hampton Roads 
Virginia in 1'9'20. He established and m'aintained a 
residence in Portsmouth, Virginia until Jan. 19'30 
for himself and wife when he was ordered to China. 
From December 1930 to March 1933 he was on active 
duty in China and then in 'Hawaii en route from 
China to H'aWaii and then en route from Hawaii 
to Hampton Roads. His wire joined him in China 
in February 1930 in Shanghai. The Complaint al-
leges that she deserted him in China in December 
1930. His wife remained in China until February 
1932 and then went to Hawaii where she remained 
until June 1932 when she returned to Virginia. 
Plaintiff returned to Virginia in March 1933 and 
instituted suit two months after his return. Plain-
tiff testified that he considered Virginia his per-
manent residence, but admitted that he had not 
lived in Virginia for the past three years. The Vir-
ginia Statute provides: - ''No suit for annulling a 
marriage or divorce shall be maintainable unless one 
of the parties is domiciled in, and is and has been 
an 'actual and bona fide resident of this state for 
at least one year preceeding commencement of the 
11 
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suit. * * * ". The Court in interpreting the law as 
applied to the facts summarized above, sa'id: 
"'To have been an actual bona fide resi-
dent of this state for one year preceeding the 
institution of a suit for divorce, means to have 
had in this state throughout that period an ac-
tual bona fide permanent abode as contradis-
tinguished from a sojourn or transitory abode 
in this state or elsewhere. The plaintiff need 
not have been physically present in Virginia 
every day during that period, but it is es-
sential that during such part of that year as 
he was absent from Virginia he was actually 
maintaining in good faith at least a locality 
somewhere in Virginia as his permanent 
abode. * * * 'There must be some evidence of 
concurring a~ts or forebearance to act which 
tend to show the actual ·continued mainten-
ance in good faith of some locality in Virginia 
as and for his permanent abode. Neither the 
unexpressed nor the mere expressed inten-
tion to so maintain a pla:ce or locality in Vir-
ginia as his permanent abode is alone suffi-
·cient to constitute the maintenance thereof 
as such. Nor is such intention plus the bare 
fact that he has retained his prior habitat in 
Virginia after several years absence with-
out having established more than a transi-
tory residence elsewhere sufficient. There 
must be actuality of residence. 
"There are many facts which are of -evi-
dentiary value as tending to show 'Continued 
actual maintenance in good faith by a person 
of a place or locality as his permanent abode 
while he is absent therefrom. Among them 
are the following: The fact that he leaves his 
wife and dependent children there while con-, 
12 
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tinuing to support them; the fact that he 
keeps a house or a room there ready for his 
occupancy or has rented it out for a compara-
tively short time because of his intention to 
return and occupy it; the fact that he pre-
serves his identiy as an inmate of a parents 
or other relatives home there; or the fact that 
he maintains the place or locality as a per-
manent address for his mail while absent, 
* * * but each case must stand upon its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances. * * * 
The evidence is sufficient to establish a 
continuance by them of domicile in Virginia 
but it is not sufficient to establish that either 
of them 'continued to 'be an actual and bona 
fide resident of this state after he or she left 
to go to China in 1930. It is true that plain-
tiff was in the service of the United States 
Navy and went to China and remained there 
and elsewhere under orders until he returned 
under orders to Virginia in March 1H33. But 
these facts did not operate to preserve his 
status as an actual bona fide resident of this 
state without his having done anything indic-
ative of the continued maintenance of some 
place or locality in Virginia as his permanent 
place of abode. * * *" 
The lengthy analysis in Appellant's brief of the 
cases bearing on the loss of domicile for voting or 
other purposes by a serviceman departing his domi-
cile under military orders, has, in so far as the res-
pondent can determine, absolutely nothing to do with 
this case. The most that can possibly be said for 
the :fa;cts as shown by the Record in the instant case 
is that appellant and respondent were married in 
13 
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the state of Arizona. A few months after marriage 
they came to Utah and resided with the appellant's 
mother while appellant found work. (R. Tr. No. 1. 
P. 5) They were only here at the most three months, 
(date of arrival and departure are not given,) and 
then appellant enlisted in the Air Force and went 
to Travis Air Force Base at Fairfield, California 
and has remained there since with his family, until 
the respondent left appellant and returned to Ari-
zona. (R. Tr. No. 1. P. 5 and Tr. No.2. P. 1) From 
October 1958 until the commencement of the ~action 
there is no showing that appellant ever returned to 
the state of Utah or that he at any time even ex-
pressed the intention of doing so. It is expressly 
stated that appellant never at any time maintained 
a residence, either rented, owned or borrowed in 
Salt Dake County, State of Utah. (R. Tr. 2, P.2) 
;The record is completely devoid of any expressed 
intention on the part of appellant or respondent 
that Utah was ever their residence or permanent 
place of abode. Under this state of the facts we do 
not think it pertinent to examine the myriad of 
court decisions relating to the effect upon estab-
lished domicile of an ~absence brought about by en-
tering military service. Suffice it to say that a re-
view of these cases clearly discloses that the facts 
as reflected by the Record in this case would not 
establish the Statutory requirement for jurisdic-
14 
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tion for a divorce under the doctrine of any of the 
cases cited by the Appellant or the addition'al cases 
examined by respondent. 
CONCL'USION 
The appellant having the burden of showing 
compliance with the statutory residence require-
ments upon which the jurisdiction of the Court is 
based, and having failed to show that the necessary 
requirements were met, the lower court correctly 
dismissed the action. The a'Ction of the lower court 
in so doing should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN S. BOYDEN 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
By Allen H. Tibbals 
351 So. State St., Suite #2 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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